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IS THE RIGHT TO STRIKE A HUMAN RIGHT?*
A. F. UTZ**
I. THE SOCIAL LIMITATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
There should be no doubt that the freedom of association, which in-
cludes the so-called freedom of coalition, is one of the fundamental rights
of human beings in the sense of natural law. Just as a human being has to
be free to structure his life according to self-determined values, he must
also be granted freedom to associate with like-minded people.
Still, neither the freedom to conduct one's life as one wishes nor the
right of association is unlimited. The conduct of individuals also affects
others. Today's problems regarding drug addicts and especially AIDS
victims clearly indicate that the individual's conduct affects the entire
society-not only because one person could "contaminate" the other, but
also because the evil which an individual inflicts on himself eventually
poses an evil for the entire society. This is not meant to emphasize the
fact that health insurance, which is also paid for by members of society
with healthy lifestyles, is burdened by those with unhealthy lifestyles.
Rather, the reason is simply that it is part of a generally accepted stan-
dard of values not to waste one's abilities by. abusing drugs. After all, as
* Translated by Hildegard Pietsch of St. Louis, Missouri.
** Professor, Fribourg University, Switzerland; Honorary President AMINTAPHIL.
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a member of a community, everyone has, along with individual rights,
the obligation to cooperate in the realization of common goals.
This isolated and still largely abstract view of subjective rights does
not clarify the question: Who in social life has the authority and the right
to define the public interest, through which subjective individual rights
are confined? Generally speaking, it is the authority of the national com-
munity. In the era of enlightenment and democratization, doubts grew
about the intellectual and moral strength of the authority of state power.
Thus, the largely individualistically viewed declaration of subjective
rights arose, especially in the U.N. declaration of human rights of 1948.
Almost every article of the U.N. declaration begins with "every person"
or "every individual has the right . . . ." Article 20, clearly states that
every person has the right to form associations freely and must not be
forced to participate in them. The penultimate (29th) article states, how-
ever, that the individual has obligations to the community in which he
alone can find his free and full development. In addition, the 29th article
requires that the exercise of his rights and the enjoyment of his liberties
are submitted "only" to legally formulated restrictions regarding the re-
spect of rights and liberties of third parties and the "just" demands of
morality, public order, and public welfare in democratic society.
II. THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
During the discussion of the U.N. Declaration, Pavlov, the representa-
tive of the USSR, fought energetically for a "democratic state" in lieu of
a "democratic society." The representative of the Philippines responded
that under the Soviet proposal, rights would be surrendered to determi-
nation by the state. The full assembly unanimously adopted the article
with the wording "democratic society". The socialist countries could,
after all, be content with this outcome since they equated the public in-
terest with the state. According to the understanding of the USSR, as
indicated by the remarks of Boris Tchechko on July 25, 1948, the free-
dom of coalition can be understood only within the context of the class-
less state of socialism. Concerning political freedom, he said that the
USSR would view it as a right to be free from the capitalist state. In the
discussion he quoted Stalin's statement in front of the Eighth Soviet Con-
gress, namely that several parties could exist only in a society in which
there were antagonistic classes fighting against each other, and that no
such classes would exist in the USSR. Article 29 would provide the
USSR with ample leeway to interpret the freedom of coalition according
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to their philosophy of the state, as provided by paragraph 2 of article 29,
which notes the limitation on individual action by the public interest as
expressed in law.
The constitutional democracies would also have to recognize this limi-
tation. Eventually, both of these societies will need legal limits to pre-
vent anti-social claims to liberty from growing excessive to the detriment
of public interest.
On the economic level, the freedom of coalition was removed from
state jurisdiction in liberal democracies by viewing the autonomy of col-
lective wage agreements as the autonomy of both sides in the negotiations
(labor unions and employer federations). Under this view both sides to
the negotiation, to an extent, can develop free of legal intervention. Both
sides to the negotiations act, so to speak, in a field free of the state. In
fact, there is a labor court to resolve controversies in labor disputes, but
not to determine the lawfulness of collective bargaining demands. The
court does not intervene unless there is legal action, and the labor court
only determines whether and how the rules of labor negotiations have
been violated in the individual case. Because many countries have no law
on labor disputes (e.g., in West Germany), the court decides cases on the
basis of previous legal developments, and decisions are made in accord-
ance with the common law. We are not concerned here with complaints
about this common law. Rather, we are concerned with the relationship
of collective bargaining autonomy and the right of strike and lock-out.
In principle, the freedom of coalition must remain within the frame-
work of state jurisdiction. With this, we again confront the dilemma that
we encountered already in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights:
whether the freedom of association will become illusory because, after
all, the state can determine what is to be understood as the freedom of
association. As indicated above, the Soviet Republic recognizes the free-
dom of association only within the framework of a communist system.
In western democracies, in which the legal system is constructed at
lower, discrete levels and connected to the highest levels of public law,
one understands freedom of association as the right to determine goals
and means of an association autonomously. But within this Western
framework we find ourselves confronting a new dilemma. Should auton-
omous determination of goals mean that the state authority no longer has
custodial power over the social sphere? If this proposition were true a
labor union could force its goals and means in a manner that would un-
dermine the present state organization.
[Vol. 65:732
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Indeed, this question is not merely theoretical. For example, the strike
of French railroaders and employees of the state electric power company
in December 1986 and January 1987, clearly illustrates that some wanted
the strike to become a test of the government's strength.
An attack on the government with an eye to a change of government
does not, as such, amount to an attack on the identity of the state. Such
a challenge led by communists bears the danger that the economic order
might lose its liberal foundation. From there it would be an easy step to
bring about a totally planned state from a planned society. This applies
not only for the strong French communist labor union, but generally for
all labor unions which pursue their goals and means on a political level.
Granted that just demands of employees have to be heard in a legal
arena, if a labor union acts as if it were a political party, then the use of
the economic threat of strike must be prohibited from the outset.
In a liberal democracy, the freedom of coalition of trade federations
can be understood only by recognizing a distinction between the society
and the state. It has not yet been decided whether the right to strike is
part of collective bargaining autonomy where labor unions and employer
federations remain strictly within the framework of society. One can
speak of the right to labor lock-outs, naturally, only after settling the
issue of the right to strike and knowing precisely what kind of strike is
involved. Contrary to the opinion of labor unions, the meaning of the
term "strike" is not clear, as we will discuss below.
Collective bargaining autonomy means the freedom of employers and
employees to negotiate for wage and working conditions. This applies,
first of all, generally to the individual as well as to coalitions. It is a
purely practical question whether collective bargaining and collective
bargaining contracts should occur only among coalitions. To point this
out specifically is significant because labor unions tend to reserve the mo-
nopoly of collective bargaining autonomy for themselves. The circle
within which collective bargaining autonomy is entitled to act must be
considered. Legitimately, this sphere is economic. Questions of school,
education and general culture are not about collective bargaining auton-
omy. Politics is even less related to collective bargaining. But the con-
ception of unions regarding their own role very often takes a different
turn. This is discussed further below.
There is obviously no difference between economy, society and social
order in the state philosophy of labor unions. The German Labor Union
Congress views itself as an organization totally involved in social policy.
1987]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss4/10
736 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
This trend came to light early in the public rallies for the right to abor-
tion. Certainly, these three realms (economy, society, and social order)
are not, contrary to the liberalist version, separated into neat compart-
ments. Still, this view circulates to this day in the universities, where
conclusions are drawn on the basis of models rather than on the basis of
reality. To be sure, the three realms are closely related to each other.
But they have their own principles of action, which must be respected to
maintain a democracy in which individual rights have priority over col-
lective rights, especially those of the state.' Labor unions of various
countries disregard this division, which is vital for a liberal democracy.
In this respect, these countries tend towards "totalitarian democracy."
It is from collective bargaining autonomy that labor unions and others
set forth grounds for the "right" to strike. Much of the blame for this
view of collective bargaining autonomy can be attributed to the U.N.
Declaration of Human Rights, which for its part is rooted in modem
subjectivism. As shown, the U.N. declaration of human rights begins
with individual rights and then adds, as a corrective device, the obliga-
tion towards society and the submission within the legal system. Thus,
the concept of order, which properly has a prior role, is relegated to a
qualifying one. Initially, the subjective right of the individual and the
freedom of coalition appear isolated and removed from the sphere of the
state. Labor unions indeed view collective bargaining autonomy as a
legal construct in itself, which is regulated only through the competition
of interests between employees and employers. This competition is
viewed as the only regulatory principle. According to the old liberal con-
cept, the state plays at most the role of a night watchman, a notion that
nicely serves the purpose of labor unions today.
The freedom of association, as stated in several national constitutions,
is based on this old liberal conception of human rights. The right to
demonstrate is very often associated with the freedom of association.
The intention behind this is to shield the rights of the individual against
the state as effectively as possible. In practice, this intention is certainly
justifiable. One needs only a different premise to leave open the possibil-
ity that the custodian of the public interest, the state, can put an end to
the free play of competition between employees and workers in cases
where the public welfare might be endangered. But this is not part of the
thinking of western democrats among whom the old liberal notion that
1. See A.F. UTZ, SOZIALETHIK, III. TEIL: DIE SOZIALE ORDNUNG 21-54 (1986).
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collective bargaining autonomy includes labor unions' right to strike sur-
vives (a notion matched by lock-out rights on the side of employers).
Simultaneously, collective bargaining autonomy became, through its con-
nection with strike and close-out, a right to dispute.
One has to keep this old liberal definition of collective bargaining au-
tonomy in mind when such autonomy is discussed. The collective bar-
gaining autonomy, with its fundamental link to strikes and close-outs, is
a typical instrument of a society of conflict, solely regulated according to
the principle of "power and countervailing power."
Today, we must seriously ask ourselves whether we can still uphold
the unrestricted right to strike in the sense of collective bargaining auton-
omy. Today strikes can no longer be justified on the basis of extreme
hardship when they cause inestimable public damage.
III. FREEDOM OF COALITION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AUTONOMY IN A SOCIETY OF CONFLICT
Subjectivism, which informed the conception of human rights, has nat-
urally changed the entire social philosophy. From the viewpoint of sub-
jectivism, it is no longer possible to define an objective, generally
recognizable public welfare. Public welfare has become a public interest
that can be determined through the democratic vote.
In earlier social philosophy, this objective public welfare was viewed as
a value superordinated to individuals; now it is equated to a common
denominator resulting from many subjective value judgments. Thus, one
speaks of value pluralism. The pluralism of values requires on-going
communication of the various intellectuals in a society. J. Habermas,
who did not want to drop the objective contents of public welfare, thus
called for an elite who should define the true public interest. His concept
is to be interpreted as an attempt to transcend the modem theory of a
society of conflict. Thus, the society of conflict faces the dilemma of not
being a genuine community at all, since only subjective value judgments
predominate in it, judgments that are in conflict with each other. Our
goal here is not to discuss the theories of Habermas. It is only empha-
sized that this theory has aimed to rescue an important element from the
earlier social philosophy. (It is an open question as to which earlier so-
cial philosophy.) This element alone is the objective, generally valid
value which makes a multitude of persons into a community. Included
in the social philosophers to whom this objective value was important
were those who leaned towards communism, like Plato and Marx. Out
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of fear of such a philosophy, all social philosophers who still talk about
an objective public welfare, were generally lumped together with commu-
nists. This is clearly the case in K.R. Popper's work THE OPEN SOCI-
ETY. Popper's "open society" became a model of a society of conflict. In
this society the principle of "power and countervailing power" (J. K.
Galbraith) is valid.
The subjectivist interpretation of human rights could welcome nothing
more than the theory of a society of conflict, which suits it. This theory
nourishes the modem view of collective bargaining autonomy with its
conception of dispute parity, which we will encounter more often. In a
conflict society, individual groups determine according to their interest
what social justice consists of. Thus, what matters is simply to formulate
the rules of the game in a society of conflict. The basic rule here is dis-
pute parity, which labor unions use to base their arguments against lock-
out.
IV. HOW DO LABOR UNIONS CHARACTERIZE THEMSELVES?
The collective of employees, that is labor unions, developed out of the
practical awareness that the individual employee could not, on his own,
rescue himself from economic exploitation as it existed in the 18th and
19th century. The labor unions' notion of their role developed from this
basis. The labor unions have retained this interpretation of their exist-
ence and function, although much in the economy's legal organization
has changed, and the social situation of employees has improved
markedly.
If the initial issue was a minimal subsistence wage, the current issue
that labor unions maintain is the "lasting social progress of employees,"
for which, however, essential parts of the liberal economic system may
have to be sacrificed. Because the larger portion of those who are active
in the economy consists of employees, it is not surprising that the inter-
ests of employees are also expressed in other areas, namely society and
politics. This is mainly because labor unions view themselves as a dy-
namic social force. The larger their successes in the area of wage and
economic conditions, the higher the standard of living for employees be-
comes, and the more labor union functionaries have to prove their effi-
cacy. In order to prove their efficacy, these functionaries strengthen the
power of labor unions not only in the area of collective bargaining, but
also by encroaching on different areas of social order and even on poli-
tics. The labor union functionaries reject a "static" characterization of
[Vol. 65:732
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labor unions, according to which the labor union would be allowed to be
active only in a defined field. Rather, they declare the goals and also the
means of labor union action each time anew. Thus, there should be no
characterization of a labor union as such, but only of its strategy.
From the viewpoint of social ethics, such a declaration is not tenable.
Historically developed social constructs have to be judged from a norma-
tive point of view, if they really are to be institutions. The labor union is
only one group in a society united by the state. It is part of a more
extensive association and has to submit to regulatory norms of the soci-
ety, even at the risk of having to give up its historically determined self-
concept. The logical consequence is that union functionaries have to be
retrained or resign. That is, after all, the fate of social "movements."
Now, if a social construct which has assumed a permanent social re-
sponsibility, as labor unions do, derives its norms of action from the his-
torical process, and if, in doing so, it assumes that all perspectives are
interest-oriented, thus historical, and therefore would have to be viewed
from their changing interests which adjust to new situations, that process
reveals an epistemological error. In reality, employees' interests are de-
fined by the trade union functionaries on their own authority. The epis-
temological method according to which one can reflect upon practice
only through practice calls to mind Marxist epistemology, expressed with
sophistication by J. Habermas in the theory of communicative
competence. z
Naturally, a social construct which determines its goals and means on
the basis of the dialectics of perspective and interest, cannot do without a
relatively stable definition of the goal. But goal definition, according to
the self-concept of labor unions, is only the extension of power. The
drive towards political involvement is only one consequence of such
definition.
Of course, the self-concept of labor unions, which is based on the dia-
lectics of perspective and interest, also affects the definition of strike. It is
assumed that strikes, the ultimate means of union self-realization, always
follow the self-interest of unions. Thus, the union definition of strike
becomes unassailable to attack from a different standpoint. This means
that the labor union is always right.
2. J. Habermas, Vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einer Theorie der kommunikativen
Kompetenz, in J. HABERMAS, N. LUHMANN THEORIE DER GESELLSCHAFr ODER SOZIALTECHNO-
LOGIE? 10141 (1971).
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V. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AUTONOMY AND STRIKE FROM THE
VIEWPOINT OF NATURAL LAW
Only natural law can be the basis for a social-ethical judgment of con-
crete social conditions. Natural law has been understood over the course
of this century to mean many different things. In this context, "natural
law" does not encompass the subjectivistic empiricist orientations of
John Locke, Samuel Pufendorf, Christian Thomasius and Christian
Wolff. Collective bargaining autonomy, as understood in article 9 of the
German constitution, is a result of this philosophy of the enlightenment.
Likewise, the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which we have previ-
ously analyzed briefly, is influenced by empiricism. Empiricism does not
recognize that norms exist that are not derived from the individual, but
which unite the many individuals into a collective "humanity". Indeed,
one can only define individual rights from this perspective. It is true that
Marxism also follows this path, but it does not see the collective as a
community of free persons endowed with autonomy. Contrary to the phi-
losophy of the natural law of the enlightenment, there is no individually
based human right. The individual has "his" right, only if he views him-
self as part of an extensive social order. The right to work, as pro-
nounced for the first time during the French Revolution on February 25,
1848, is not possible as a purely individual right. The pitiful bankruptcy
of state owned workshops, which were supposed to demonstrate this pu-
tative subjective right, support this conclusion. It is true that every per-
son has the right to determine his profession, and to choose freely his
place of work. But the general right to work is limited by legitimate
concerns not only of others, but of the entire society. Fundamentally,
the general right to work is nothing but everybody's right to full employ-
ment politics.3 The freedom to choose one's career in the sense of a
clearly circumscribable subjective right has never existed and is incon-
ceivable in terms of social philosophy. Provided that they are rights qua
liberties, which require protection from external force but not a directly
positive service from society, one may speak of a certain unvariable appli-
cation of natural law on the particular social situation (freedom of con-
sciousness and religion). Yet, as soon as these liberal rights are actively
externalized (freedom of expression), they approach social limitations.
Quite different from the individualistic representatives of natural law is
3. See A.F. UTz, Rech aufArbeit, in 38 ARCHIV FOR RECHTS - UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE
385-400 (1949-50).
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Thomas Aquinas. He sees the norms of natural law primarily as regula-
tory norms, but-in contrast to Hegel and Marx-he views these as regu-
latory norms of the community, which is a custodian of personal values.
Such a natural law cannot be expressed in a concise phrase. It is true
that one can say that all people have the right of self-realization, but it is
self-realization within the community. How individual rights are formu-
lated, with regard to the right to work, on the basis of natural law was
illustrated earlier. The norms of natural law are not primarily rights one
is entitled to claim from the community, but norms of the organization
with regard to general human values. Today we have lost this regulatory
thinking completely. The collective bargaining autonomy, as it is viewed
today, clearly indicates this fact. Both employer and employee are subjec-
tivists of our society; both are privileged through positive law. Other
members of society have to stand by and watch how a strike develops as
if this labor dispute were not of interest to them, notwithstanding how
they suffer from it when their electricity is switched off, when they can no
longer ride the trains or when their garbage left in front of their door is
no longer picked up - threatening an epidemic. Nobody in this state of
affairs questions the reasonableness of such a strike for the population.
The custodian of public welfare is left only with the task of finding a
substitute for the strikers.
Even though the regulatory norms of natural law are based on the
collective and not on the individual, the individual interest must still be
attributed a protected status lest individual rights be delivered over to the
head of state. Thus, it lies within the application of the norms of natural
law to search for a formulation which takes into account both the entire
order and limits to governmental power. The individual right of ac-
cepting or rejecting a job offer is also valid in Thomas Aquinas' percep-
tion of natural law. This right does not, however, entail that the
individual is offered the job of his choice. Moreover, the freedom of job
choice is linked to the obligation to work not only in one's own interest,
but also in the interest of the entire community. Under this presupposi-
tion of economic politics which subjects itself to public welfare, the rejec-
tion of any job offer can no longer be justified. Thus, the employment
refuser assumes the entire risk. This also applies to claiming, without
regard to the public interest, the freedom of refusing collectively an em-
ployment contract offer (including work and wage conditions). Apart
from this, a collective (the labor union) carries a larger responsibility for
the community because the collective walk-out means greater damage to
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the community than the mere individual walk-out. Thus, the notice of
termination of a collective labor contract is ethically more irresponsible
than the individual walk-out. The opinion of the Supreme German La-
bor Court (court order of January 28, 1955), that the observance of con-
tracts tightly binds the individual, but does not bind the collective with
regard to strike, can no longer be justified in ethical terms, as we will
note below. This court order reveals perhaps most clearly the inconsis-
tency which lies in today's perception, namely that the collective bargain-
ing autonomy is viewed only as an instrument of subjectively interpreted
self-interests. Behind this perception lies the philosophy of natural law
of the enlightenment.
According to the classical philosophy of natural law, as represented by
Thomas Aquinas, collective bargaining autonomy is to be formulated as
follows: Collective bargaining autonomy is the right of the individual
employee and employer as well as that of their collectives to negotiate the
wage and working conditions freely with consideration of the public in-
terest. The concept of public interest includes the competence of the
state authority to intervene in any way necessary when the public interest
is threatened. With this, the outcome of the negotiations as well as the
means of reaching an agreement are, in principle, subordinated to gov-
ernmental authority. Such is the case in the entire area of contractual
business. The state can and, under certain circumstances, must enact
appropriate laws for this contractual business.
From this point of view on human rights, that is, from the standpoint
of natural law, it is simply the general statement that every person is free
to accept or decline a certain job offer. Thus, the individual bears the
risk of choosing to decline a job offer. If he is already covered by an
employment contract, then (from the viewpoint of human rights) he can
terminate this contract only if the conditions of this contract have
changed substantially, and the contract has become inhumane. The em-
ployee's unilateral contract termination through walk-out thus takes
place because of an emergency, and is in this case at his own risk. Addi-
tionally, this view supposes that the employees are not protected, at a
minimum subsistence level, through support at the expense of the entire
society. If employees are supported through self-financed insurance, this
is a different matter. But it is always, in as far as one remains on the level
of natural law, a pure walk-out, or in more precise legal parlance, a re-
tention of employment slots. No consideration is given to the struggle
against the entrepreneur to force concessions from him as the concept of
[Vol. 65:732
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strike implies. Only in the case of emergency can workers legally refuse
to work while retaining their jobs. Emergency means, in this context, an
injustice which is generally considered to be manifest. The criterion of
this manifestation is not only derived from the testimony of the em-
ployee. Furthermore, this criterion need not be only one of minimum
subsistence level. A gross injustice of distribution, although above the
subsistence minimum, can also be the cause of walk-out. One must not
identify injustice which lies above the subsistence minimum, however, as
injustice against a minimum of subsistence. In order to speak of human
rights in a concrete case, a certain general, spontaneous perception of the
facts is necessary. Human rights should always be justified by appeal to
an objective state of affairs which is spontaneously recognizable through
human reason, not from a subjective value sentiment. Undoubtedly, this
objective criterion can be determined with regard to a subsistence mini-
mum, but not above this level. Above the subsistence minimum, the em-
ployee, who refuses to work because of employer injustices, must be
supported through unmanipulated public opinion. Only in this way can
he certify his action as generally recognizable through reason.
Fundamental rights or human rights can, however, be effectively as-
serted only if they are somehow legally formulated. For this reason, the
charter of human rights cannot be legally enforced if it has not been un-
dersigned by a state. As long as the fundamental right of walk-out has
not been formulated by the legislator in terms of positive law, the walk-
out is completely at the employee's risk, exactly like the citizen's resist-
ance to state authority.
Naturally, the human right to strike can be used individually as well as
collectively. But it cannot be emphasized enough that the human right of
walk-out is not the same as the right of strike, which is now valid in many
countries. Strike is a particular kind of walk-out. It has a foundation
different from that of the ordinary walk-out which one describes as a
human right. To guarantee in the constitution the right to "strike", as
for instance the Spanish state constitution does, is a fundamental error.
In the German "basic law", the right of freedom to form economic coali-
tions (labor unions and employers' federations) is included (art. 9, 3), but
the right to strike is not mentioned. It is true that some German jurists
believe that the right of coalition is associated with the right to strike.
This interpretation, however, is not necessary. Only actual human rights
belong in the constitution. The right to strike is, however, no human
right.
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Strike has its foundation in the subjective value sentiment of an em-
ployee that his wages and working conditions are unfair. It is never only
an individual, but always a collective walk-out. What is more, the em-
ployees do not inquire of public opinion when they strike. They engage
in a work stoppage because they themselves are of the opinion that they
can demand more and more of the employers. Their attitude is ac-
counted for by the principle of a competitive struggle in the market econ-
omy. Naturally, employers try to make clear to employees in
negotiations that their demands will adversely affect the entire economy
and thus, will also endanger their jobs. Under certain circumstances, the
employees drive a hard bargain, even though their strike results in price
increases. The public is not asked its view. On the contrary, the strike
harasses the public in an attempt to gain public support for the employ-
ees' demands.
VI. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AUTONOMY, STRIKE, AND LOCK-OUT
IN THE MODEL OF A MARKET ECONOMY
In the market-economy model, economic equilibrium is defined ac-
cording to the balance of supply and demand (with respect to purchasing
power). In the same sense, social balance is defined according to the
equally represented power of employees' coalitions (labor unions) and
employers' federations. Because, as is generally the case in the market,
the price of goods is set by their value in exchange, labor is also appraised
according to its exchange value. Insofar as the laws of the market are
realized in perfect competition, both parties to a collective wage agree-
ment should achieve equilibrium (parity) and thus a result which, eco-
nomically speaking, is fair for both parties. If there is market parity
between the entire group of employees and the entire group of employers,
a lock-out is unnecessary. During a conflict, the employees do nothing
more than decline the job offer of the entrepreneurs, breaking the em-
ployment contract. They are consequently dismissed. According to the
law of supply and demand, every offer lapses when it does not find con-
sumers on the market. In this context, the apodictic assertion that a
strike would require a lock-out by the other side, is a rash statement. It
anticipates something which exists or seems to exist, but on a level differ-
ent from that of the market-economy model.
Note that it is a model, and that this model includes the entire group of
employees and the entire group of employers. This model spawns the
union argument that lock-out is an employer's instrument that destroys
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parity. The union argues that employers are sufficiently protected with-
out lock-out because job offers are at their disposal. The argument of the
unions becomes untenable as soon as the model no longer has a founda-
tion in reality. And in de facto terms, this is precisely what happens.
The model, in its entirety, never captured reality and never will. First,
a pure market economy cannot be a guarantor of social equilibrium. Sec-
ondly, and this is more important in our context, workers and employers
are not juxtaposed, neither at the national nor the international level.
This, however, is implied by the model, because it refers to employee and
employer in an abstract, purely conceptual way.
To picture this model, one can think of a large factory in which the
entire group of employees is opposed to one entrepreneur. At the mo-
ment the employees stop work, they are automatically dismissed, and
there is no need for a lock-out. De facto, the strikers give their notices
through their strike. It is supposed, according to the law in most coun-
tries, that a strike does not repeal the labor contract. This is nonsense.
As long as a contract is valid, strike is a breach of contract. If the labor
contract has expired and new wage negotiations are being conducted and
the employees do not accept the employers' offer, they are not striking.
Rather they are simply rejecting the offer and leaving the company. In
this case, no lock-out is necessary. Such is the model.
It is assumed, however, by a considerable number of interpreters of the
West German Constitution that the right to strike necessarily follows
from collective bargaining autonomy. Strictly according to the model of
a market economy, collective bargaining autonomy only means the right
of each partner to conclude or terminate a labor contract freely and with-
out external force. The model, which is conceived purely in terms of a
market economy, does not say anything about the social components of
collective bargaining autonomy. These components consist, for example,
of the material or personal risks that one or both partners assume if an
offer is declined, be it a matter of labor or the work site.
On the basis of this model, one cannot refer to strike and lock-out in
common legal usage. For this, the model is too abstract. This fact can-
not be emphasized enough. Economic theory speaks of market economy
in a purely formal sense. If one were to apply this model in a realistic
setting, then one would have to think of the aforementioned factory, in
which all employees of all times and in all nations are united. This uni-
formity of employees and employers does not exist in reality. There are
many national economies, many sectors within these economies, and
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many individual enterprises within these sectors. The point is that the
unity of the model is not realistic. Today we know this well, because
everyone complains about protectionism, which would not exist if the
market economy model were realized worldwide.
The social goal indicated in this model is to obtain the maximum and
best supply of material goods for society. The motivating force is the
self-interest of both employer and employee. In this connection, all so-
cial interests that go beyond those participating in the economic process
(family members, the sick, the disabled, etc.) are taken into account only
through the self-interest of employees. The market-economy model
knows no social-ethical preconceptions. Those are taken into account
solely in the so-called social market economy. This topic, however, be-
longs to economic politics found in the real economy. If, in the current
situation, unions demand absolute parity in the labor struggle, the
presuppositions of the market-economy model, from which this demand
arises, would also have to be fulfilled-primarily the condition that the
employees enjoy no social support except their own means. This makes
it easier for them to strike.
In a market economy, the self-interest of participants should ideally
include the preservation of the order of a market economy. For instance,
wage demands should ideally give more consideration to the future of the
economy, and to the sound development of the production process.
Likewise, entrepreneurs should have an interest in manpower being
spared to a large degree in order to promote productivity, and in the
environment not being exploited. But since individual self-interest is in
the forefront of the market-economy model, expectations that such con-
siderations would be included are exaggerated. In the self-governing cor-
porations of Yugoslavia, this disharmony clearly manifests itself between
short term and long term self-interest, which goes beyond the everyday
situation. An older employee close to retirement is, for example, more
concerned with his immediate income than with the company's prospects
in the distant future. Also, in a capitalist economy, the employees who
make decisions that affect the future of the company, and even the entre-
preneurs themselves, can give too little attention to the company's sur-
vival. This lack of attention may, for example, result from an
unwillingness to adapt to technological development, or more frequently
from proposing exaggerated benefit plans or company retirement plans,
which cannot be financed by a shrinking staff.
For the self-interest of those participating in the economy not to sup-
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press intertemporal, political economy concerns, a higher agency which
can effectively enforce such considerations is necessary. Here, we touch
on a thought which is alien to a collective bargaining autonomy under-
stood in purely procedural terms and devoted to conflict theory.
To deal with this abstract market-economy model is increasingly im-
portant to understand collective bargaining autonomy and the topic of
strike/lock-out, which is usually discussed in the same context. Unions
draw their concept of strike from natural law and assume that the right
to strike is a human right. However, they take their arguments for parity
in labor struggle and against lock-out from the abstract market-economy
model which, in concrete applications, must undergo many revisions and
transformations.
Collective bargaining autonomy, derived from the market-economy
model, must take into account the cartel concept. If an individual con-
tract, as a result of its economic effect, influences the market strongly, it
must be subject to the control of cartel law. In the past, wage contracts
were contracts of (smaller) unions with individual companies which did
not influence the market beyond this realm. Today, economy-wide wage
contracts in fact function like federal laws. Thus, wage contracts must be
subject to the control of the Cartel Office.
VII. THE SOCIAL-ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE MARKET
ECONOMY AND OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AUTONOMY
According to general experience, humans act out of self-interest. So-
cial politics, concerned with the realization of public interest, must take
this self-interest into account. According to the subsidiary principle, it
will thus give priority to personal decisions, to insure effective perform-
ance, even though they are motivated by self-interest. The limit, of
course, is always the public welfare, which is ultimately determined by
state authority. Persons and groups should be able to stand in mutual
competition.
This demand presupposes, however, an at par relationship between the
individual members of a society. What is to be viewed as genuine parity
can be judged only from the standpoint of public welfare. Thus, a philos-
opher of social ethics cannot agree to the unqualified dominance of soci-
ety in conflict. As stated, the upper norm and extreme limit of
competition, or of conflict, always remains public welfare as defined by
state authority. Because, however, state authority cannot determine a
priori public interest in detail, even though it has to formulate broad fun-
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damental values (e.g. the fundamental rights of a person and the preser-
vation of natural institutions, such as marriage and family), the
competitive activity of individual groups is indispensable. This socio-eth-
ical conception implies, however, the conviction that one cannot dispense
with justice, at least roughly definable and "objective" justice in any
society.
In a modem pluralist democracy, however, considerable skepticism
exists about whether there is any objective definition of justice. A desire
exists to define justice purely methodologically, that is as a result of the
exchange or conflict between the individual and various interest groups.
There is no longer any desire to credit any social authority with the
knowledge and the responsibility regarding a universally accepted con-
cept of justice. Some suggest that modem pluralist democracy could
only be understood methodologically, that is as a society in progress in
the empirical sense, as an universally open society.4
Union politics is still dominated by the idea, long obsolete, that pro-
gress in society can only be achieved through class struggle. Labor un-
ions can indeed point out the results of labor struggles of the past. But
those were the days in which the strike was still associated with the walk-
out in the definition of natural law.
Pluralist society, which develops not from a plan from above but from
the initiative of individuals or of groups formed by them, must create
some kind of regulatory mechanisms that achieve the desired services for
the public welfare through individual initiatives with some probability.
In the field of supply of material goods, this regulatory system is the
market economy. It is the best guarantee of the necessary services, with-
out which the public welfare would not materialize. In this context, ser-
vice is to be understood not only as the utilization of manpower, but also
as care for the optimal utilization of producer's goods on the basis of
ownership rights. This ultimately ties the risk of decision over capital to
one person or, as in corporate enterprises, to several persons.
Thus, one can use the market-economy model to orient oneself in the
economic system. This means that to the extent that it is socially tenable,
one can leave the relations between employee and employer to the mar-
ket laws of supply and demand. This is where collective bargaining au-
tonomy begins. The dynamics of the market economy demands
autonomy of decisions on the sides of labor and capital. But what are the
4. See DIE OFFENE GESELLSCHAFT UND IHRE IDEOLOGIEN (Utz ed. 1986).
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conditions of this autonomy and what are the means of their
accomplishment?
As shown, it is presupposed in the model that the laborers' free de-
mand for work stands opposite to the employers' free supply of work.
This means of accomplishment consists, on one side, of the bilateral free-
dom to refuse to accept a job offer and, on the other side, the freedom to
refuse to offer different work conditions. In reality, however, collective
bargaining autonomy looks different.
VIII. THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE REAL MARKET ECONOMY
In reality, as already stated, the economy is no all-encompassing con-
struct in which power relations between all employees and all employers
are settled at one time. Many national economies compete with each
other. Wage and labor conditions cannot be negotiated independently of
foreign trade considerations. Otherwise, a nation's capital would be con-
sumed. Thus, an imbalance in power relations to the disadvantage of em-
ployers occurs which, of course, also affects employees in the long run,
because they would lose their jobs. Employees do not take this conse-
quence into account, however, during labor conflicts.
In addition, wage and work conditions are only negotiated in particu-
lar economic sectors or regions. Thus, calls for parity which stem from
the model are fulfilled neither on a national nor on an international level.
Without exception, only a fraction of the employees of a sector or even of
an individual business is on strike. To an alarming degree, however, the
consequences reach further than the strike itself.
From this realistic viewpoint, the protection of property and of busi-
nesses requires the possibility of lock-out. Defenders of lock-out empha-
size in particular the preservation of the company, and relatively little
attention is given to ownership rights. The preservation of companies is,
of course, the most obvious reason for lock-out. But in the liberal econ-
omy, the continued existence of businesses depends substantially on the
right to own production goods, to which the right of disposition is closely
linked. The right of lock-out is to be seen from the viewpoint of the
individual holding the property right and the corresponding right of dis-
position over production goods. Those who offer manpower are distinct
from those who control the means of production.
If the employees themselves were the owners of the company, no strike
would occur and lock-out would of course be unnecessary. Labor unions
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have well understood this state of affairs; namely, that regarding the right
of lock-out, the ownership of property is what ultimately matters. They
cite as a reason for banning lock-outs that the entrepreneur derives suffi-
cient bargaining power from his status as a property owner. Thus they
fall back upon an argument that was valid within the framework of the
market-economy model but does not apply to the real economy. The
right of lock-out as a defense against strike becomes an indispensable
companion to the right of ownership of production goods (naturally al-
ways under the presupposition that the right to strike is valid). There-
fore, under this condition, the lock-out creates no disparity in the labor
dispute. It is only in this concrete context that the argument of employ-
ers as well as that of the German Federal Labor Court, namely that lock-
out is justified by the distribution of property and by the continued exist-
ence of companies, is conclusive.
Lock-out is, as stated, a counter measure against strike, primarily
against strikes that target specific sectors. But it receives its justification
not on the basis of a putative right of retaliation but rather from the right
of property or, more precisely, the right of disposition over property
which must be protected for the preservation of the company. The
striker violates the exercise of the owner's disposition right, which has
been guaranteed in the contract. This is true even without any destruc-
tion of the company's production goods or items of furniture.
The argument of labor unions that entrepreneurs do not need lock-out
because they own the means of production is incorrect for several rea-
sons. First, it rests on the abstract market-economy model and does not
apply to reality. Second, the private ownership of production goods en-
tails burdens as well as rights. These burdens can be borne only if there
is production. During the strike, however, the machines stand idle. De-
spite his property right, the employer is powerless if employees refuse to
work.
Employees are justifiably outraged if an entrepreneur manages his
company poorly and thus endangers jobs. But there is less discussion of
the detrimental effect of strikes, and even less of the fact that strikes in-
volve contract violations. Also none consider that the employee like any
other person has an obligation to work despite his job choice, especially
when he is under contract. By fighting against lock-outs with the argu-
ment that employers possess sufficient bargaining power simply through
their ownership of production goods, the unions presuppose that their
strike is a self-evidently justified means through which the unions achieve
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their subjectively determined goals. With this, the contract violation as-
pect is concealed.
Most dubious from the viewpoint of social ethics is the opinion, held
by the West German Labor Court and others, that the collective could
break the labor contract through strike while the individual is not enti-
tled to such a right. But, the obligation of contractual fidelity applies
equally to the collective and to the individual. Labor lawyers assert that
workers who strike in order to improve their employment conditions do
not terminate their employment and thus do not elect to hand in their
notices. But why would this apply only to the collective and not to the
individual? Moreover, such an "interruption" of the employment rela-
tion would be conceivable only in the case of a substantial change in the
conditions under which the labor contract was concluded. For in that
case, the law provides the individual with the possibility of giving notice
that he will no longer honor the contract and also offers the legally en-
forceable right to adapt a contract due to the termination of the transac-
tion basis.
Today's collective bargaining autonomy is derived from the freedom to
engage in labor disputes and requires a parity of the parties, similar to
the formal competition in the market-economy model. This parity is
never practicable. Today, the unions have means of exerting pressure so
that not only the employer but also the entire economy is affected. It is
finally time to become liberated from the perceptions of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Today, the issue is no longer the attainment of
a subsistence wage for the employees. Rather the issue is only a dubious
wage increase and the further reduction of already reduced working
hours. For such purposes, the economically disastrous means of strike is
employed as if a substantial emergency still existed.
Today, one can generally no longer speak of a walk-out as based on
natural law and thus on human rights. No longer does a walk-out usu-
ally arise from a critical employment situation which would itself entitle
the employees to strike. In modem industrial states, the employee can
draw on multiple sources of social welfare protection against the subsis-
tence minimum. Strikes are paid for de facto by the entire society, espe-
cially by tax payers and consumers. Is, for example, a strategically
devised strike targeting the piston industry, which paralyzes, in the long
term, the entire automobile industry and related supporters, objectively
justified?
On the basis of the modem legal form of collective bargaining auton-
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omy, a strike is not justified, for instance, when employees refuse to nego-
tiate even though there is still hope of settlement. This procedural
criterion of justice, however, does not suffice to justify a strike objec-
tively. The real norm of justice is public welfare, which includes the
rights of employees as well as employers and consumers, that is, of all
members of society.
The theory of society in conflict, which belongs to the concept of plu-
ralist democracy, provides only for procedural public welfare. Accord-
ingly, the employee-employer relationship is not definable according to
appropriate norms. At most, one can speak of moral behavioral norms,
the observance of which one may expect from both sides of industry. But
such moral expectations are not sufficient to rehabilitate society in con-
flict. If the conflict involves an equal distribution of power and has been
carried out according to the rules of the competition, the outcome of the
conflict is fair. Bringing the matter before the labor court is thus moti-
vated only by a legal challenge to a disproportionate exercise of power.
Moreover, it is the labor unions involved that determine when a strike is
justified.
How far the individualistic concept of interest has advanced into legal
practice or perhaps had to advance under the influence of modem think-
ing, becomes obvious in the written opinion of the highest West German
labor court (3/11/1986) concerning the prohibition on utilizing the ab-
sence of employees. The court stated that the employee has an interest in
"not giving the employer prompt and economically accessible informa-
tion about times of absence and sickness." If this information were in
any way disadvantageous to the employee, which cannot be excluded,
one would have to confront these disadvantages with different legal
means.
If the entire society were regulated according to such subjectivistic,
methodological standards, those who do not have power massed in
groups would be soon excluded from society. Under this aspect, the larg-
est union is not more just than the small ones. The abstract conflict
model, which clearly bears the characteristics of old liberal philosophy,
corresponds most closely to the industrial labor union, which would nat-
urally like to represent all groups of employees. Those who fail to join
are at a disadvantage. Thus, the employee is compelled to join this one
union, regardless of how strongly the individual employee might disagree
with its ideological orientation. The individual perhaps has an abstract
right to make his opinion known in such an industrial labor union, but he
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must, in any case, surrender to the majority. This is the means of finding
justice in a society of conflict.
According to unions, conflicts have an important innovative function
for social progress. Strike fulfills this necessary function by contributing
to social progress through rational conflict settlement. Thus, moderniza-
tion is the result of conflict.
It is widely acknowledged that the strike has served this useful func-
tion in social history. For Germany, this consequence of union strikes is
indisputable. Yet, one must be skeptical of generalizations, particularly
improve the quality of life of employees. F.A. Hayek raised some re-
markable objections regarding the "beneficial" activity of unions:
It is indeed more than likely that in countries in which labor unions are
very strong, the general level of real wages is lower than it would be without
them. This certainly applies to most European countries, where labor
union politics is even reinforced by the general use of restrictive practices,
such as "job promoting" utilization of manpower, which is not in demand.'
After the right to strike has been viewed as part of a catalogue of fun-
damental rights of labor unions and is, in addition, understood purely
strategically, a criterion of justice for strikes no longer exists outside the
sphere of dispute parity thinking. An exception can exist in the case of a
ruinous strike; however, even a strike with this intent can be disguised
and is not provable legally, including a strike with political goals. On the
basis of labor law, the right to a lock-out is not to be ruled out. Thus,
one is on an infinite parallel of parties entitled to dispute. Where should
this end? How does one get out of this muddle, which began with talk of
the subjective right to strike without any mention of standards, and the
higher ruling authority which legally formulates the highest norm?
Even a market economy founded on the liberty of contract presup-
poses a governmental authority that must watch over the preservation of
everybody's freedom to contract, and restrict through cartel laws, the
contract rights for those who have, or try to achieve, too much market
power. Collective bargaining autonomy, however, which can continue
its existence only in the market economy, pays no price for this liberty.
On the contrary, through its claim to the right to collectively violate le-
gally concluded individual contracts, the labor union abolishes the insti-
tution of liberty of contract, additionally supported through strike as a
means of coercion. Here begins the inconsistency with law and justice
5. F.A. HAYEK, DIE VERFASSUNG DER FREIHEIT 345 (1971).
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and the incompatibility of collective bargaining autonomy, understood in
purely social conflict terms, with the market economy.
Collective bargaining autonomy, as it exists de facto, levels wages and
thereby makes everyone equal. It shortens working hours of laborers to
35 hours, while managerial employees, managers and independent busi-
ness people work 60 to 70 hours (without social insurance).
Even without the right to strike, which should be obsolete because of
its adverse economic consequences, collective bargaining autonomy re-
tains its social significance. It is not clear why both partners do not have
a duty in a collective wage agreement to subordinate themselves to an
arbitration tribunal if they cannot reach a compromise. The keen de-
fenders of pure market economy fear that workers and employers could
join forces and transact wage settlements, which would disrupt price for-
mation in the market economy. But in reply it can be asked: Do strikes
and lock-outs guarantee fair wages in a market economy, or do they in-
stead amount to a compromise between two cartels at the expense of
those social members excluded from the negotiations? With regard to
the concern that price formation in a market economy would suffer with
a ban on the right to strike, it should be noted that international competi-
tion alone could insure that entrepreneurs would not simply rely on pass-
ing on the costs of increased wages. How the arbitration court would
have to be structured, how it would be composed, and at which point in
time it would have to go into action during disputes, is a question that is
left to pragmatists. But one legal prescription is necessary: that an arbi-
tration court would have to end the conflict in an extreme case in order
to avoid a strike.
Of course, it would be ideal if one were able to leave, without such a
legal prescription, both sides of the industry with the responsibility for
resolving their conflict on the basis of a correctly understood collective
bargaining autonomy. This requires, however, that one presuppose that
both sides of industry fulfill their obligation towards the public welfare.
It corresponds to the subsidiary principle that small communities first
have the right, prior to state action, to prove their autonomy. In this
construction principle, the responsibility and the efficiency for the public
welfare play a decisive role. But this is no longer evident in today's dis-
pute parity. It is doubtful too, whether in this highly complicated indus-
trial society, involving international competition, both partners of
industry are still in the position to find beyond their own interests a just
resolution that would include all members of society. In any case, the
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German Trade Union Federation has not recently furnished proof that it
is capable of fulfilling these conditions. To threaten rashly a strike, even
if it is only a warning strike, indicates clearly that the public welfare is
being confused with self-interest.
IX. ULTIMA RATIO
From the viewpoint of natural law, the ultima ratio lies in the notion
that a critical situation for employees, which is manifestly significant and
unreasonable, can be abolished only through walk-out. In such an emer-
gency, an error regarding justice is out of the question. The ultima ratio,
understood in the sense of an unquestionably gross injustice, applies to
every economic system. Essentially, it is not a strike in the sense of labor
dispute law, but merely a right of job retention.
But the framework of collective bargaining autonomy does not men-
tion this. The issue here is compliance with a regulatory system with
regard to collective, universally applicable negotiations of work condi-
tions. Thus, when the employees cannot go along or, more accurately,
do not want to go along with the suggestions of entrepreneurs in any
way, one speaks of ultima ratio as justifying a strike on this level. It
justifies a strike because in a society of conflict the bargaining positions,
which are motivated by interests, have priority over any objective norm
of justice, even though the employees may be morally obliged to remain
proper and to take the public welfare into account.
X. SUMMARY
1. From the viewpoint of natural law, that is, of social ethics and thus
of pre-positivistic law, the right to strike is an emergency right. Here,
emergency is to be understood as (a) employment conditions below sub-
sistence minimum, a self-evident state. A walk-out, however, is effected
at the striker's own risk similar to the right of resistance against state
authority, and is justified (b) in a broader, analogous sense, by any other
state of manifest social injustice which, however, must be supported by
unmanipulated public opinion. Even in this case, the striker bears the
entire risk.
2. Collective bargaining autonomy does not necessarily entail the
right to strike.
3. Collective bargaining autonomy, even though a fundamental right
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of both sides in a dispute, must not be carried out within a sphere beyond
the state. Its boundaries must be legally defined.
4. In modem industrial society, the right to strike has become gener-
ally obsolete as a consequence of:
a) the high standard of living of employees,
b) the social protection of employees through various social
institutions,
c) the disastrous consequences for the national economy and its
international competitiveness, and
d) damage done to third parties, who are not active in the econ-
omy, under certain circumstances especially the unemployed.
5. To view the right to labor dispute as an indispensable ingredient of
collective bargaining autonomy is a fundamental error in today's under-
standing of collective bargaining autonomy, which has its foundation in
the subjectivistic theory of conflict society.
6. It is inconsistent with social ethics to view collective bargaining
autonomy merely as a procedural mode which necessarily involves parity
in the dispute.
7. A social ethical investigation of strike and lock-out which begins
with dispute parity is no longer ethics, but rather a theory of strategy. In
addition, considerations of material elements (social differences between
dispute parties) does not lead beyond a purely procedural examination.
The necessary involvement of objective justice disallows any purely mo-
dal or procedural definition of justice in the sense of dispute parity.
8. In terms of social ethics and constitutional law it is necessary to
re-establish and preserve the monopoly power of the state.
9. In the case of a collective bargaining conflict which cannot be re-
solved by the parties in the dispute, arbitration procedures should be con-
ducted. In the last instance, there should be an agency that can be called
upon for a proper legal ruling in order to prevent a strike. With this, a
judgment about warning strikes has been implicitly made. The putative
right to strike has to be overcome in a similar manner as the feudal law
which became obsolete through eternal domestic peace.
10. The loss of power of labor unions and the working class in gen-
eral, a consequence of restrictions on the right to strike, is substituted by
the increasing influence of employees via worker participation at the in-
ternal company and entrepreneurial level. In a co-determined economic
constitution, primitive means of labor struggle no longer have any place.
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11. Given what we have said about the right to strike, the lock-out
becomes superfluous. The right to lock-out could be discussed only on
the grounds of the theory of dispute parity. Here would be its justifica-
tion as a defense measure of employer federations against strikes. The
notion that a legal dispute between both sides of industry is to be con-
ducted, so to speak, exclusively on the grounds of dispute parity, has to
be attributed to the ill-considered adoption of the modem theory of soci-
ety of conflict.
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